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EVIDENCE: THE ROLE OF RECONSTRUCTION EXPERTS
IN WITNESSED ACCIDENT LITIGATION
ROBERT EMMETT BURNS*
HE PROPRIETY of expert testimony in injury or death actions
where speed, point of impact or locale of the vehicles are in-
gredients of fault or responsibility continue to occupy the at-
tention of Illinois appellate courts, particularly in the areas of so-
called "reconstruction" evidence which is offered as the opinion of
"accidentologists."' In Adkins v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railroad Co.,2 the Third Appellate District Court upheld the admis-
sion of reconstruction evidence by an expert on the brake and air
brake lag time involved in a crossing collision,' despite the fact that
* Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law; B.S., Holy Cross; J.D., Yale Law
School; LL.M., New York University. Professor Bums has published numerous
articles; two of his most recent articles in this Review are cited at 402 U.S. 183
(1971) and 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
1. The development of experts in the field of accident reconstruction is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. In the past, police officers who routinely investigated
accidents were regarded, and are regarded today, by some courts as non-experts,
but qualified to express certain opinions based on views and experience. Some-
times a university professor with a background in engineering or physics is used to
make certain mathematical calculations and evaluate accident occurrences by apply-
ing generally accepted laws of physics. Today, the study of accident occurrences
is a field all to itself. Experts are trained to evaluate data such as skid marks,
gouges in the road, location of debris and oil slicks, and measure the extent and type
of damage to vehicles; to use scientific data to infer such things as speed of vehicle
prior to braking, speed at contact, angle of impact, location of impact, etc.; or to
determine whether brakes were working, whether the electrical system was function-
ing, etc.
The Northwestern University Institute of Traffic is a leader in the field of acci-
dent reconstruction and has for a number of years conducted numerous experi-
ments and evaluations in attempting to refine and perfect accident reconstruction.
The reconstruction expert today has a background in engineering and physics.
He combines knowledge of theorems and formulae of the scientist with the practical
and trained eye of one who has observed numerous accident scenes.
See generally, DeParcq, Law, Science and the Expert Witness, 24 TENN. L. REv.
166 (1956); McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert
Testimony, 23 TExAs L. REv. 109 (1945). On reconstruction evidence the leading
Illinois case is Miller v. Pillsbury, 33 11.2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965).
2. 2 Ill. App.3d 906, 274 N.E.2d 507 (1971).
3. Id. at 918, 274 N.E.2d at 515.
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there were three eyewitnesses to the collision between a train and
plaintiff's auto. In Siltman v. Reeves,4 the Fourth Appellate District
Court reversed the acceptance of reconstruction evidence that plain-
tiff's rear back-up light was not lighted at the time of the collision,
apparently because there "were eyewitnesses," a 1970 vintage quali-
fication of the leading 1965 supreme court ' opinion admitting recon-
struction expert evidence."
It is possible to reconcile Adkins with Siltman on the theory that
in the former, eyewitness, driver, engineer and brakeman were not
able to assist the jury,7 thus "making it necessary to rely on knowledge
and application of principles of science beyond the ken of the av-
erage juror"8 (admitting a reconstruction expert). However, in Silt-
man, where taillight evidence was otherwise established' by "crcd-
ible, physical or eyewitness evidence,"'" no reconstruction expert
opinion was admitted.
4. 131 II. App.2d 960, 269 N.E.2d 728 (1971).
5. Plank v. Holman, 46 ll.2d 465, 264 N.E.2d 12 (1970). "However, re-
construction testimony may not be used as a substitute for eyewitness testimony
where such is available." Id. at 470, 264 N.E.2d at 15 (1970).
Accord, Geisberger v. Quincy, 3 111. App.3d 437, 278 N.E.2d 404 (1972); McMa-
hon v. Coronet Insurance Co., 6 Il1. App.3d 704, 286 N.E.2d 631 (1972).
6. Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 1ll.2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965), a death case
in which there were no eyewitnesses. For a rundown of majority and minority
views, see Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1048 (1959).
7. "However, none of these witnesses were able to assist the jury as to time
and distances involved, e.g. braking time and air brake lag time." 2 Ill. App.3d
at 919, 274 N.E.2d at 516 (1971).
8. Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 11l.2d 514, 516, 211 N.E.2d 733, 735 (1965).
9. In Sitman, a highly qualified traffic reconstruction expert testified that, in
his opinion, based on his examination of a taillight filament, the taillight of the
tractor was off when it was hit from the rear. This opinion was contrary to testi-
mony of three witnesses, all of whom had a close relationship with plaintiff (one
eyewitness testified she saw a red flashing taillight on the back of the tractor). Other
evidence tended to show that the tractor was not equipped with a working flashing
taillight. There was testimony of the investigating police officer that the taillight
filament was intact after the accident, that the filament was not in the same condi-
tion then as five months later when the expert examined it, and that the light
switch on the tractor was in a position where, if the system were working properly,
the taillight would have been on.
The expert evidence was based on the condition of the filament on the taillight.
The expert testified to the probability that the light was broken or not in order at
the time of the accident.
10. "There is no place for the opinion of a reconstruction expert if the determin-
ative facts are otherwise established by credible physical or eyewitness evidence."
131 II1. App.2d at 963, 269 N.E.2d at 730 (1971).
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The question remains: Does the presence of eyewitness evi-
dence,1 with or without the Deadman's Act disqualification (if it be
a death action), ipso facto defeat, in Illinois, the propriety of prof-
fered reconstruction expert testimony12 on such common accident
matters as the condition which caused the injury, the speed of ve-
hicles," point of impact,14 or the locale?1" The persistence of pa-
11. For a definition see Elliot v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co., 325 Ill.
App. 161, 59 N.E.2d 486 (1945).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (1969) disqualifies party survivors and those di-
rectly interested in the event from testifying, unless called (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 60 (1971)) by the adverse party in interest (protected estate).
In Plank v. Holman, 108 Ill. App.2d 216, 246 N.E.2d 694 (1969), rev'd 46 Ill.
2d 465, 264 N.E.2d 12 (1970), the appellate court felt that reconstruction evidence
on behalf of plaintiff should have been allowed, for the occurrence witness failed to
describe the incident in any detail. In reversing, the supreme court instead empha-
sized their unwillingness to allow reconstruction testimony to be used as a substitute
for eyewitness testimony where such was available (leaving arguably open what
should be done if eyewitness testimony is available but not particularly helpful).
In Ficht v. Niedert Motor Service, Inc., 34 Ill. App.2d 360, 181 N.E.2d 386 (1962)
the Second Appellate District approved excluding testimony of an expert witness on
the ground that his testimony, contradictory to that of the eyewitness, would tend
to confuse the issues, invade the province of the jury, and make arrival at a just
verdict more difficult.
13. Though there were no competent eyewitnesses, expert opinion evidence from
a state highway officer, a graduate of Northwestern's Traffic Institute, was rejected
by a divided court in Deaver v. Hickox, 81 111. App.2d 79, 224 N.E.2d 468 (1967),
on appeal from a two-car death collision trial. The relevant trial scenario went
something like this:
"The Court: Let me ask you, Officer, do you feel that you have sufficient back-
ground to express an opinion on the matter?
"A. Yes, I have an opinion. I can't say exactly, naturally. I don't think anyone
can where you've got an impact involved, say exact speed. I think I could from
past experience more than education, can estimate a speed, speculate a speed,
rather.
"Mr. Ryan: Did you say speculate a speed, Trooper?
"The Court: You mean estimate, based on skid marks and impact there as you
saw it?
"A. Well, Your Honor, more on automobile damage than the skid marks. Skid
marks, where you have a terrific amount of automobile damage following it,
from my study, leaves a lot to be desired. You can't go much by the skid marks
when you've got a terrific lot of automobile damage after it.
"Mr. Ryan: And that's what we have in this case. I understood the trooper to
say here that where there are terrific skid marks and terrific damage to the
automobile it is difficult to estimate the speed.
"The Court: From the skid marks.
"A. From the skid marks, yes."
The jury was then returned to the courtroom. The witness was then asked:
"Q. Now, officer, based on the observations which you have made and which
we placed in our question to you, do you have an opinion as to the speed of the
defendant's Falcon when it struck the doctor's Buick? ...
"'A. I do.
"Q. And what is that opinion?
10 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [VoL XXII:7
rameter litigation concerning whether these matters are "beyond the
ken of the average juror"1" seems but reminiscent of earlier expert
opinion restrictions to only cases of absolute necessity where the
jury would be incapable of drawing any conclusion unless expert
evidence was provided.
The no-expert-needed rule, or, as it may also be called, the com-
mon-knowledge rule, provided that it was reversible error to receive
the opinion of experts on that which was common knowledge."
One text written on opinion evidence in Illinois' 8 presents an inter-
esting insight into the early use of this rule:
[The] early decisions of Judge Breeze illustrated this attitude [against experts] ....
He obviously relishes stating that "the most accomplished expert," "the most accom-
plished mechanic," "the most renowned bridge builder" is no more competent to give
an opinion on a certain subject than the ordinary man. 19
Within the past twenty-five years, there have been great advance-
ments made in the art of scientific evaluation of automobile acci-
"A. My opinion is that the speed at the time of impact would be between sixty
and sixty-five miles an hour." Id. at 82-83, 224 N.E.2d at 469-70.
It is to be noted that in Illinois, as an exception to the fact-opinion rule, a lay wit-
ness familiar with the speed of a vehicle may testify to the speed in terms of fast or
slow, McKenna v. City Ry. Co., 296 Ill. 314, 129 N.E. 814 (1921), but not "too
fast." Delany v. Badame, 49 Ill.2d 168, 274 N.E.2d 353 (1971).
14. See Diefenbach v. Pickett, 3 Ill. App.2d 80, 248 N.E.2d 840 (1969); Baker,
Scientific Reconstruction of an Automobile Accident, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 439
(1958); Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1048; contra, Geisberger v. Quincy, 3 Ill. App.3d 437,
278 N.E.2d 404 (1972): "We find no authority that an officer may express an
,assumption' as to which ends of the involved vehicles came together." Id. at 443,
278 N.E.2d at 407 (1972).
15. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 287 (1964); see also Thomas v. Cagwin, 43 Ill.
App.2d 336, 193 N.E.2d 233 (1963). Concerning skid mark evidence, see Annot.,
23 A.L.R.2d 112 (1952).
16. Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 Il.2d 514, 517, 211 N.E.2d 733, 735 (1965).
17. See KING AND PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS, at 41 (1942): "In
1913, in the last case reversed under the common knowledge doctrine, plaintiff had
been injured when a wheel came off a wagon. The reversal was on the ground that
the opinion of blacksmiths were erroneously admitted to the effect that the friction of
the wheel on the axle caused heat; that this caused the axle to expand; that the nut
on the axle would also be heated and the heat would cause it to break off. The Su-
preme Court held that these expert opinions were facts 'within the knowledge of
every man of ordinary intelligence.' Judge Carter, the Chicago Judge, dissented.
The trial judge, three judges of the Appellate Court and Judge Carter (five judges in
all from Chicago) held these opinions not within the common knowledge of a
Chicago jury, but the six judges of the Supreme Court from downstate disagreed and
reversed the case. Hoffman v. Tosetti Brewing Co., 257 Ill. 185, 100 N.E. 531
(1913)."
18. KING AND PELLINGER, supra note 17.
19. id. at 40.
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dents. The average man knows little about reaction time, braking
power, and stopping distance; about the laws of action, geometric
formulae of acceleration and deceleration, and coefficients of fric-
tion; the laws of physics and dynamics. The average man has had
little practical experience in investigating accidents and testing and
familiarizing himself with the various aspects of automobile acci-
dents.
Today, the trend seems to be in the direction of allowing expert
evidence to aid the jury in drawing proper inferences from raw physi-
cal facts of accidents. 20  However, a ghost of the "no expert rule"
20. See Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1048 (1967) citing Miller v. Pillsbury, 33 Ill.2d
514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965).
The following edited (REB) example of selections from a reconstruction case was
found in WALTZ, CASES IN EvIDENcE 2d, at 565-71:
Direct Examination
"Q. Please state your name and address.
"A. My name is and my office is in Manhattan.
"Q. What is your profession, your scholastic background, and what licenses have
you held up to the present time?
"A. I am a graduate of Stevens Institute of Technology, 1926 ME. I hold pro-
fessional engineers' licenses in New York, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, and
have been in the engineering profession since the date of my graduation. I am a
member of the American Association of Mechanical Engineers, the American
Society of Safety Engineers and the National Association of Professional En-
gineers.
"Q. As part of your regular profession, in making accident reconstruction evalu-
ations, have you in the past analyzed and studied roadway and damage markings
left by various vehicles which have been involved in collisions?
"A. Yes.
"Q. How many years have you been doing this?
"A. For over thirty years.
"Q. Is there a recognized scientific formula for determining speed from skid
marks?
"A. There is.
"Q. What is it?
"A. V is the square root of 30fS. The capital 'V' is the velocity of the moving
object expressed in miles per hour. The small letter 'f' is the 'coefficient of
friction' of the roadway. The capital 'S' is the length of the skid mark ex-
pressed in feet.
"Q. Does this formula take into consideration the things we discussed before,
namely 'reaction time,' distance, the 'drag' or 'breaking' distance factors, and
the sum total of both known as the 'speed distance' factor?
"Q. Assume also that the trailer-tractor left the type of skid marks shown in the
photo and that the testimony of a State Trooper has indicated that they were 90
feet long, and that Dodge sedan was pushed another 67 feet from the point of
impact, would you be able to compute, with reasonable certainty, the speed in
which the truck was traveling prior to the impact?
"A. Yes. My computations would indicate that it was traveling at least 65
miles per hour at the time the brakes were applied, and 40 miles per hour, as
testified.
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may remain to haunt the attorney. Because impact, speed or locale
"opinions," especially by non-eyewitnesses, appear to be opinions on
"ultimate issues," there may be a fear that such testimony will invade
or usurp the province of the jury to find the facts."
The case of Gillette v. City of Chicago2" illustrates the vitality of
the ultimate issue rule in Illinois. In that case expert testimony as
to the necessity of shoring up a building when that was the main
issue of the case was found inadmissible. The court said that an
expert may testify on the ingredients of the ultimate issue, but not
on that issue itself. 23
In 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the case of Miller
v. Pillsbury Co.24 and in it decided to follow the modem trend of
permitting reconstruction experts to testify. The court recognized
that this would entail some conflict with the ultimate issue prohibi-
"Q. I show you another photograph, plaintiff's exhibit C, which has been
identified by the trooper as fairly representing the appearance presented by
the sedan shortly following the collision. Is the type of damage shown thereon
significant to you and if so, why?
"A. Yes, it indicates the 'crushing' type of damage sustained by the sedan to
which I have referred, as distinct from 'rotation' type of damage. This cor-
roborates the opinion I previously gave, for this crushing type of damage shown
here would be expected if a fast moving trailer-tractor were to strike a slow
moving, or stationary, sedan."
21. See Fitch v. Niedert Motor Service, Inc., 34 Ill. App.2d 360, 371, 181 N.E.2d
386, 391 (1962): "The question of defendants' conduct in making this turn in
the manner in which the truck collided with the car in which the plaintiff was
riding was an ultimate issue in the case. It involved the conduct of these defend-
ants which was for the jury to pass upon. Wawryszyn v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.,
10 111. App.2d 394, 397, 135 N.E.2d 154 (1956). The course which the truck took in
making the turn at the intersection was a matter of common observation of the
witnesses who saw the occurrence. The jury is able to properly comprehend and
weigh the facts without the aid of an expert. To permit an expert witness to recon-
struct the scene of a collision and retrace the movement of a vehicle from the point
of impact back to some point prior thereto, and testify in contradiction to the testi-
mony of witnesses who viewed the occurrence, would open the door in every per-
sonal injury case to expert testimony on factual matters, and would be an invasion of
the province of the jury. If expert testimony were permitted, the opposing parties
would have the right to introduce experts of their own. This would tend to con-
fuse the issues and make the arrival at a just verdict more difficult."
22. 396 Ill. 619, 72 N.E.2d 326 (1947), but see Clifford-Jacobs Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 19 Ill.2d 236, 166 N.E.2d 582 (1960).
23. Proposed Federal Rule 704 provides: "Testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ulti-
mate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Accord, Uniform Rule 56(4), Cal-
ifornia Evidence Code § 805 (1972), New Jersey Evidence Rule 56(3) (1972).
24. 33 Ill.2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733 (1965).
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tion, but pressed the belief that since the jury could accept or reject
the testimony, their province was not invaded. The jury still re-
tained the final decision-making power.
The ultimate issue restrictions, it is submitted, should be found,
if anywhere, not in what Wigmore called "mere rhetoric" about
usurping the jury function,2" but in the threshold decision of whether
or not the subject, by sound discretion, generally admits of a need or
usefulness of expert opinion evidence in the first place.26
A third factor tending to chill proffered efforts of experts to re-
construct what happened in a contested accident case is the strong
common law preference for the most objective evidence. This has
been held to mean fact observation rather than mere surmise, con-
jecture, conclusion, or inferences.2 7  Witnesses must, after all, state
facts, not opinions.28
25. 7 WIGMORE 3d § 1920, 17 (1940).
26. As Judge Craven (4th Appellate Dist.) put it in dissenting to the Deaver v.
Hickox rejection of reconstruction evidence, quoting Buckler v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 68 I1l. App.2d 283, 293, 216 N.E.2d 14, 19 (1966): "To render an opinion
an expert need only possess special skill or knowledge beyond that of the average
layman, and the determination of his qualifications rests within the sound discretion
of the trial judge, People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 550, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911). The
weight to be attached to such an opinion is a question for the jury in light of the ex-
pert's credentials, the facts upon which he bases his opinion and any limitations placed
thereon during cross-examination ....... 81 Ill. App.2d 79, 89, 224 N.E.2d 468,
473 (1967).
In Abramson v. Levinson, 112 Ill. App.2d 42, 50, 250 N.E.2d 796, 800 (1969),
the First District opinion sets out suggested factors needed in the exercise of trial
discretion to accept reconstruction opinion:
"I. The expert has the necessary expertise as a result of education, training and ex-
perience in the specific area about which he expresses an opinion,
"2. The area of inquiry should require the employment of principles of physics,
engineering or other science or scientific data, beyond the ken of the average juror,
"3. The opinion of the expert cannot be naked, but must come clothed in eviden-
tiary facts in the record, the inferences reasonably arising therefrom and must be
elicited by hypothetical questions containing substantially all of the undisputed facts
in evidence relating to the issue about which an opinion is sought, and
"4. There must be a need apparent from the record in the case for scientific knowl-
edge, expertise and experience which will aid the jury to a correct and a just result."
27. See Siefferman v. Johnson, 406 Il1. 392, 94 N.E.2d 317 (1950).
28. The authors of OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS, supra note 18, illustrate on
page 1 the workings of the opinion rule with an amusing and somewhat suppositous
case:
"A JURY trial. A witness on direct examination is describing an automobile
accident:
"Q. What happened then?
"A. The lady in the car that got hit stumbled out of her car and fell in a
faint.
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Parenthetically, witness testimony is not observed "fact" at all,
but instead represents a filtered post hoc effort to reconstruct past
"fact" ("reality") through the medium of nouns and verbs of the
present.
In any given trial, what is fact and what is opinion depends upon
which statement is specific enough to allow the jury to draw their
own inferences from facts. The statement: "He was driving care-
lessly" may be held to be opinion when compared with the state-
ment: "He was driving on the wrong side of the road;" and that
statement may seem like opinion when compared with "He was driv-
ing on the left side of the road on a two-lane highway going north."
Speaking of "compared to what," query: Which would be more re-
liable in a contest over a disputed accident-(1) an expert opinion
based on skid marks, extent of vehicle damage, final position of ve-
hicles on highway, and, in a proper case, an expert's speed estimate
of 35 m.p.h., or (2) lay eyewitness testimony that the vehicle was
going "fast"? Still, there ought to be limits to trial by expert.
Nonessential reconstruction testimony may waste time and pre-
sents a specter that the very presence of the expert will unduly im-
press the jury far beyond the value of his testimony without corre-
sponding benefit of adding anything worthwhile or helpful. 9
Lawyers who elect to try a no-liability case, or who fear cross-
examination of eyewitness survivors, ought not to be able to obscure
this type of evidence by instead resorting to the testimony of an ac-
cidentologist who would reconstruct an otherwise plain fact situation
in the language of expertise and opinion.
Still, if distinction be the life of the law, perhaps additions are
needed in reconstruction evidence guidelines."0 Language that ex-
"Defense counsel: Move to strike the opinions of the witness. Let him state
the facts.
"The Court: Strike them out. The jury will disregard that answer. [To
the witness:] You must state the facts and not your conclusions regarding
them. You can't give the jury your opinion as to which car got hit, whose
car it was, how the lady got out of the car or why she fell, if she did fall-
you must state the facts."
29. See Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REV. 277
(1952), where the author points out that in a 60,000 word society, an overly liberal-
ized reform of the rule against opinion could lead to a return to the earlier oath
helping stage where much of everything seemed mere opinion.
30. See Abramson case standards, supra note 26.
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perts may not substitute their opinions when there is any eyewitness
evidence (perhaps the origin of the thought that if an eyewitness
is available, no reconstruction expert will ever be proper), or that
speed, distance, locale, or point of impact evidence are not beyond
the ken of the average juror if any eyewitness evidence is available,
don't quite describe the apple. Perhaps more track is needed. In
Wrongful Death Act cases where the evidence proof problems are
aggravated by that Act,31 reconstruction expert evidence might be
proper, irrespective of eyewitnesses, if either party is disqualified by
direct interest in the affair. 2
Reconstruction evidence may be all geometry, but more evidence
guidelines for trial judges could provide a little less appellate conjec-
ture on the subject.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51 § 2 (1969). Here's one from the docket of Judge
Harold Clarke of the 5th circuit: "Plaintiff, intestate, age 23, had been out with
friends. At about 1:00 a.m. he went to a tavern which was closed, and then was
apparently returning to his home, traveling south. The defendant, a railroad switch-
man, got off work at 12:00 a.m., stopped at a tavern where he was identified, had a
drink and proceeded toward his home. The two cars met head-on on a divided
four-lane highway; plaintiff died. It was impossible to determine from the debris or
position of the cars which party was going north and which party was going south.
Plaintiff tried to establish by evidence that the deceased was traveling toward home,
going south. A discovery deposition declared that defendant was traveling south.
Investigation by both parties indicated they both were traveling in a southerly di-
rection and therefore the cars could not have met head-on. After suit was filed and
prior to trial, defendant was killed in another accident."
In the recent Illinois Supreme Court opinion of McGrath v. Rohde, - Ill. 2d -,
- N.E.2d - (1972), a tender of a reconstruction expert by plaintiff-estate was
rejected in a death action. The appellate opinion stressed that eyewitness testimony
had been made available to the plaintiff when he, by deliberate choice, chose to call
an incompetent defendant under section 60 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act (calling
an adverse party). The supreme court opinion, however, hastened to add "that the
plaintiff chose to call the defendant as a witness did not eliminate or diminsh the
standards of admissibility for reconstruction expert evidence." - Ill. 2d -, - N.E.
2d - (1972). Query: to what extent should the presence or absence of available
incompetent party testimony, made competent by the Illinois Dead Man's Act, affect
the propriety of reconstruction evidence? One could argue by analogy to the Illinois
allowance of careful driving habits of the deceased to show due care of the plaintiff,
a concession to necessity or need quite unrelated to whether or not the evidence
would be beyond the ken of the jury.
32. The appellate court in Plank v. Holman, 108 Il. App.2d 216, 246 N.E.2d
694 (1969) favored qualifying incompetents or those directly interested in the ch. 51
event if the party bearing such testimony elected to present reconstruction experts.
